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ON AMERICAN DEMAGOGUERY TO NATIONAL SECURITY 
Jennifer Brumfield 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing, once all 
other possibilities are exhausted.1 The United States Intelligence 
Community is one example of the truthfulness of this statement. From 
their inception, intelligence agencies have conducted investigations in 
ways that infringe on the rights of Americans.2 In 1976, Senator Frank 
Church of Idaho established a select committee in the United States 
Senate to investigate alleged improprieties in how the Intelligence 
Community gathered its information.3 The final report, known as the 
Church Committee report, consists of six books and seven volumes of 
testimony detailing systemic disregard for the law and liberties of 
American citizens.4 The Church Committee identified abuses committed 
by various intelligence agencies, including the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”), Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”), and the National Security Agency (“NSA”).5   
Lack of oversight and regulations in the Intelligence Community were 
the primary factors contributing to these abuses of power. The Church 
Committee report stated that “establishing a legal framework for agencies 
engaged in domestic security investigation is the most fundamental 
reform needed to end the long history of violating and ignoring the law.”6 
The final report included legislative and regulatory recommendations 
intended to provide greater checks and balances within the Intelligence 
Community.7 The Church Committee established the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (“SSCI”) to provide “vigilant legislative 
 
 1. This quote is often attributed to Winston Churchill, though there are doubts as to its 
authenticity. See The Churchill Project, Americans Will Always Do the Right Thing, HILLSDALE COLLEGE 
(Nov. 22, 2016), https://winstonchurchill.hillsdale.edu/americans-will-always-right-thing/ (confirming 
that while Churchill may have expressed this sentiment, it has not been discovered in any transcript, 
memoir, published or private writings, speech, or correspondence). 
 2. DAVID KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND 
PROSECUTIONS, § 2.2 (3d ed. 2019). 
 3. See S. Res. 21, 94th Cong. (1975) (enacted, establishing the Senate Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). 
 4. See id.  
 5. See S. REP. No. 94-755, bk. 1 (1976), [hereinafter Church 
I],https://archive.org/details/ChurchCommittee/mode/2up. 
 6. See S. REP. No. 94-755, bk. 2, at 296 (1976) [hereinafter Church II], 
https://archive.org/stream/ChurchCommittee/Church%20Committee%20Book%20II%20-
%20Intelligence%20Activities%20and%20the%20Rights%20of%20Americans#mode/2up. 
 7. Id. at 296-97. 
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oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States to assure that 
such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.”8 The Committee also recommended that the Attorney 
General, as the Chief Legal Officer of the United States, be charged with 
ensuring intelligence agencies follow the law when conducting 
investigative activities.9 
Imposing a legal and regulatory structure on the intelligence 
community proved to have a substantial impact on the way secretive 
national security investigations are performed in the United States.10 The 
most prominent legislative example is the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (“FISA”), signed into law by President Jimmy Carter in 
1978.11 Congress envisioned FISA to remedy the misuse of electronic 
surveillance detailed in the Church Committee report by requiring judicial 
review of all foreign intelligence electronic surveillance conducted within 
the United States.12 FISA has been amended numerous times since its 
inception and the narrow criteria to obtain a FISA warrant under the 
original law has expanded to allow FISA evidence to be used in criminal 
prosecutions.13 
A recent decision from the Ninth Circuit highlights the danger of 
allowing prosecutors to use FISA information during criminal trials. In 
July 2014, Su Bin, a China-based businessman, was arrested in Canada 
and charged with conspiring to steal secrets regarding the C-17 military 
transport plane manufactured by Lockheed Martin.14 Previously, Wired 
magazine reported that China may have acquired some of the C-17’s 
blueprints from a spy who worked at Boeing.15 After reading the Wired 
 
 8. See S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976) (enacted). In addition to the SSCI, Congress established 
the House Permanent Select Committee on Investigations in response to the Church Committee 
recommendations. 
 9. Church II, supra note 6, at 332.  
 10. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 2.7. 
 11. See id.; see also 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801-1855c, Title 50 U.S. Code, Chapter 36. 
 12. FISA Conference Report, see also Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978), available at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf#page=1.  
 13. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 3.9. Originally, a “wall” existed between foreign 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies that prevented the use of evidence gathered during a FISA 
warrant from being used in domestic criminal prosecutions. Later amendments to FISA have eliminated 
the wall. See infra Section III(A). 
 14. See Matt Hamilton, Chinese Citizen is Sentenced to Prison in the U.S. for Plotting to Steal 
Military Secrets, L.A. TIMES (July 13, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-chinese-
boeing-hack-prison-sentencing-20160713-snap-story.html. 
 15. David Axe, China’s Giant Transport Plane Takes Flight, WIRED (June 28, 2013), 
https://www.wired.com/2013/01/china-transport-first-flight. A previous version of this Wired article, 
published in December 2012, identified the potential Boeing spy as Dongfan Chung. Chung was convicted 
in 2011 of providing Boeing trade secrets to China. United States v. Chung, 659 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2011). 
The updated version of the Wired.com article states only that “Beijing may have also acquired some of 
the C-17’s blueprints from a spy working at Boeing.” 
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article, an FBI agent began to look for Su's possible accomplices.16 
Eventually, the FBI arrested Keith Gartenlaub, a senior engineer at 
Boeing.17 The impetus for focusing on Gartenlaub centered on the fact 
that his wife was a naturalized Chinese-American citizen and his in-laws 
lived in Shanghai.18 
The FBI monitored Gartenlaub for over a year and obtained a warrant 
from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to monitor his home.19 
Using this FISA warrant, the FBI tracked Gartenlaub’s phone calls, 
emails, and bank records, in addition to breaking into his home and 
copying computer hard drives.20 The FBI found no evidence of 
espionage.21 However, the FBI claimed to have found child pornography 
on one of Gartenlaub’s hard drives.22 The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
Gartenlaub’s conviction for knowingly possessing child pornography, a 
charge many degrees removed from espionage—the purpose for which 
the FISA warrant was granted. The Supreme Court denied Gartenlaub’s 
petition for writ of certiorari.23 
This Article discusses the risks of using information gathered in the 
pursuit of foreign intelligence, ostensibly for national security reasons, in 
domestic criminal prosecutions. In these situations, defendants have no 
ability to access the information underlying the FISA warrant, no ability 
to challenge the evidence being used against them criminally, and thus no 
realistic chance to defend themselves. This Article also explores whether 
restricting the use of non-responsive FISA information is even possible 
in light of the ever-expanding authority granted to the Intelligence 
Community. First, this Note analyzes the history of the Intelligence 
Community, the role of the FBI within that paradigm, and the persistent 
violations of American liberties in the name of national security. Next, 
this Note chronicles the Title III warrant requirements and the FISA 
 
 16. Brief for Appellant at 6, United States v. Gartenlaub, 751 F. App’x 998 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 
16-50339), 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 27920. Wesley Harris, an agent in the Los Angeles FBI office, 
launched the investigation after reading the Wired.com articles. 
 17. United States v. Gartenlaub, No. SA CR 14-173-CAS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192041, at *1-
2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2015). Gartenlaub was arrested on August 27, 2014.  
 18. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, at 7.  
 19. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Gartenlaub v. United States, 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
1005, at *11-17 (Mar. 7, 2019). Agent Harris originally obtained a warrant pursuant to FRCP Rule 41. 
Unable to find evidence of national security crimes, Harris then applied to the FISC for a secret warrant 
under the FISA statute.  
 20. Id. at *16. 
 21. Id. at *10. 
 22. Id. at *19. The FBI was granted a second Rule 41 warrant to search Gartenlaub’s home, this 
time for evidence of child pornography. Its probable cause affidavit in the warrant application stated 
evidence was found “during a court-authorized search without notice.” 
 23. Gartenlaub v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1609 (Apr. 22, 2019) (certiorari denied by U.S. 
Supreme Court). 
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statute from their origin to the modern-day versions, and how the 
September 11, 2001 attacks significantly impacted the use of FISA in 
intelligence gathering. This Note will next argue for reform of the current 
procedures around when information from FISA warrants is used in 
criminal prosecutions, analyzing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United 
States v. Gartenlaub, which erroneously prevented the defendant from 
viewing the underlying FISA warrant application. Finally, the Note 
concludes by examining the risks of allowing intelligence gathered for 
foreign investigations to be used domestically and offers suggestions for 
mitigating the harm to criminal defendants.  
II. BACKGROUND 
The law governing National Security Investigations (“NSIs”) is a vast 
and storied attempt to answer the question of “whether liberty and security 
are locked in a zero-sum game.”24 Criticism of recent investigations 
involving political actors, including the President of the United States, 
provides a ripe opportunity to explore whether and to what extent 
curtailed liberties are truly necessary under the cloak of national 
security.25 Section II(A) discusses the structural hierarchy of the 
Intelligence Community and the role the FBI plays in domestic 
intelligence gathering. Section II(B) discusses systematic abuses in the 
collection of intelligence against American citizens and the reform 
measures taken by the legislative and judicial branches in response to 
those improper procedures. Section II(C) provides background 
information regarding the origin and current nature of Title III and the 
FISA statutes, including the fall of the so-called “FISA wall” after 9/11. 
Lastly, Section II(D) analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s United States v. 
Gartenlaub decision.  
A. The Intelligence Community and the FBI 
The Intelligence Community as we know it today originated with the 
National Security Act of 1947.26 The purpose of the 1947 Act was to 
 
 24. KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 1.1.  
 25. On July 31, 2016, the FBI opened an investigation into whether the Trump campaign 
coordinated with the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The Inspector 
General of the DOJ found serious and significant errors in the FISA applications on Carter Page, discussed 
infra Section III(B). See generally, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of Four 
FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation  (Dec. 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/storage/120919-examination.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2020). 
 26. Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 2, 61 Stat. 496 (1947). Before the National Security Act of 1947, 
intelligence activity conducted by the federal government mainly consisted of activities by military 
branches, the State Department, or the Office of Strategic Services.  
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“provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United 
States, [and] to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and 
procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the 
Government relating to national security.”27 The drafters of the 1947 Act 
faced the seemingly unworkable puzzle of how to create one collective 
Intelligence Community out of related but separate departments of 
government, while also balancing the national security powers granted to 
the President in Article II of the Constitution.28 The drafters’ solution was 
to create the National Security Council, over which the President presides, 
to organize the disparate entities, act as the arbiter of information, and 
advise the President with respect to national security matters.29 The 1947 
Act also organized the Army, Navy, and Air Force under a single 
Secretary of Defense and created the CIA.30 Today, the Intelligence 
Community consists of seventeen separate organizations headed by a 
Director of National Intelligence (“DNI”).31  
Unlike the CIA, the FBI existed prior to the National Security Act of 
1947.32 In 1908, the FBI was formed in order to have an agency capable 
of enforcing federal criminal laws and handling national security issues.33 
The jurisdiction, mission, and organizational structure of the FBI has been 
in flux since its inception: 
At first, agents investigated mostly white-collar and civil rights cases, 
including antitrust, land fraud, banking fraud, naturalization and copyright 
violations, and peonage (forced labor). It handled a few national security 
issues as well, including treason and some anarchist activity. This list of 
responsibilities continued to grow as Congress warmed to this new 
investigative force as a way to advance its national agenda. In 1910, for 
example, the Bureau took the investigative lead on the newly passed Mann 
Act or “White Slave Traffic Act,” an early attempt to halt interstate 
prostitution and human trafficking. By 1915, Congress had increased 
 
 27. 50 U.S.C. § 3002. 
 28. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, §§ 1.2-1.3. 
 29. See id. at § 1.3. 
 30. See id. 
 31. Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Member Agencies, U.S. INTELLIGENCE CAREERS, 
https://www.intelligencecareers.gov/icmembers.html (last viewed Feb. 2019). The member list as of 
February 2019 includes: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 
Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 
National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, Department of Energy, Department of 
Homeland Security, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, 
U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Marine Corp., and U.S. Navy. 
 32. A Brief History: The Nation Calls, 1908-1932, FBI , https://www.fbi.gov/history/brief-history 
(last viewed Feb. 9, 2019) (stating “It all started with a short memo, dated July 26, 1908, and signed by 
Charles J. Bonaparte, Attorney General, describing a ‘regular force of special agents’ available to 
investigate certain cases of the Department of Justice. This memo is celebrated as the official birth of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation—known throughout the world today as the FBI”). 
 33. See id. 
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Bureau personnel more than tenfold, from its original 34 to about 360 
special agents and support personnel.34 
While not technically authorized to investigate subversive activities in 
the United States, the FBI’s appropriations statute allowed it to 
investigate any matter requested by the Executive Branch through the 
State Department.35 This lack of legislative authority allowed President 
Franklin Roosevelt to determine a basic domestic intelligence structure 
and choose which government agency would carry out the general 
objectives beyond criminal investigation.36 In cooperation with Attorney 
General Homer Cummings and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, Roosevelt 
approved a joint FBI-military plan for domestic intelligence in 1936.37 
The jurisdiction granted for this FBI domestic intelligence included vague 
and conflicting orders to investigate “subversion” and “potential crimes” 
related to national security.38 It also included a mandate to investigate 
foreign involvement in American affairs.39 The FBI remains the primary 
civilian agency charged with domestic intelligence responsibilities in the 
United States. 
Roosevelt’s decision to place control over the FBI’s domestic 
intelligence investigations solely at the direction of the executive branch, 
with no congressional oversight, resulted in the FBI becoming 
increasingly isolated from outside control.40 By 1942, the FBI was 
responsible for all investigations “coming under the categories of 
espionage, subversion, and sabotage . . . involving civilians in the United 
States.”41 The FBI began to resist supervision in the area of national 
security by its parent agency, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and the 
Attorney General.42 When Congress did pass legislative statutes 
establishing standards and procedures implicating FBI programs, FBI 
officials chose to disregard Congress and proceed with the programs 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 1.7.  
 36. See Church II, supra note 6, at 392. 
 37. See id. Roosevelt, Hoover, and Cummings deliberately excluded Congress from this 
policymaking process to keep the President’s orders secret. A memo prepared by Hoover stated: “In 
considering the steps to be taken for the present structure of intelligence work . . . in order to avoid 
criticism or objections . . . by either ill-informed persons or individuals having some ulterior motive . . . 
it would seem undesirable to seek any special legislation which would draw attention to the fact that is 
was proposed to develop a special counterespionage drive of any great magnitude.”  
 38. See Church II, supra note 6, at 24-27. It is unclear precisely what the President’s reference to 
“subversion” or “potential crimes” was intended to cover for investigative purposes.   
 39. See id. 
 40. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 2.6. 
 41. Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval 
Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Division (Feb. 9, 1942). 
 42. See Church II, supra note 6, at 22. 
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unchanged.43 Thus, by the time the National Security Act was passed in 
1947, the culture at the FBI was already one of independence as far as 
national security investigations were concerned. As such, being subjected 
to a new reporting scheme under the National Security Council changed 
virtually nothing about how the FBI proceeded.44 Indeed, not until 2007 
were DOJ attorneys “given comprehensive authority to examine the FBI’s 
national security program for adherence to all applicable laws, 
regulations, and guidelines.”45 
B. Improper and Illegal Techniques 
The Church Committee report documented stunning details about the 
breadth and depth of improper investigative techniques being deployed 
against American citizens by the FBI.46 While recognizing that 
government actors often have legitimate purposes to covertly gather 
information about American citizens, the report confirmed that actions 
taken by the FBI “exceeded the restraints on the exercise of governmental 
power which are imposed by our country’s Constitution, laws, and 
traditions.”47 The report focused on three types of intelligence activities—
gathering of information, dissemination of that information, and covert 
activity—and found widespread abuse in all three areas.48 The main 
problems identified in the report were numerous: too many people spied 
on, too much information collected, the use of intrusive and surreptitious 
techniques, political groups and private citizens being surveilled based on 
their lawful political lobbying, and blatant disregard for the law when 
 
 43. For one example, see Church II, supra note 6, at 54-57. Congress passed the Emergency 
Detention Act of 1950 establishing standards and procedures for detained persons in the event of war. FBI 
officials decided the statutory procedures, which included recourse to the courts instead of suspension of 
habeus corpus, would destroy their secretive compiling of a security index of “potentially dangerous” 
persons to be detained immediately in the event of war.  
 44. See Church I, supra note 5, at 45. In the years immediately following passage of the NSA of 
1947, Presidents Truman and Eisenhower both declared the FBI was still authorized to broadly investigate 
“subversive activity,” with no directive to limit the allowable procedures. Truman also approved the 
creation of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference to supervise coordination between the FBI and 
the military of all intelligence matters affecting internal security.    
 45. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, National Security Division Launches New Office of 
Intelligence (Apr. 30, 2008), available at https://fas.org/irp/news/2008/04/doj043008.html.  
 46. Abuses were not limited to the FBI. See, e.g., Church II, supra note 6, at 6 (detailing the CIA’s 
opening and photographing of first-class letters, the NSA’s obtaining millions of private telegrams sent to 
or from American citizens, and the IRS’s opening of tax investigations based on political rather than tax 
criteria).   
 47. Church II, supra note 6, at 2. 
 48. See id. at 1. The committee defines intelligence gathering as activities such as “infiltrating 
groups with informants, wiretapping, or opening letters,” and defines covert activity as “action designed 
to disrupt and discredit the activities of groups and individuals deemed a threat to the social order.” 
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conducting these activities.49 
Historical lack of oversight allowed the FBI to order investigations into 
any person or group it wished to investigate with minimal supervision. 
Counterintelligence techniques previously deployed only against hostile 
foreign actors were turned inward and used against “perceived domestic 
threats to the established political and social order.”50 The FBI labeled 
these domestic techniques as also being counterintelligence programs, 
designating them with the acronym “COINTELPRO.”51 Between 1956 
and 1971, the FBI approved over two thousand COINTELPRO actions.52 
By 1975, the FBI possessed over 500,000 domestic intelligence files.53 
Each file contained information on more than one individual or group, 
meaning that the number of American citizens unknowingly under 
surveillance was far higher than number of files.54 At one point, the FBI 
even maintained a list of at least 26,000 people to be immediately 
apprehended and detained in the event of a “national emergency.”55  
These programs’ widespread gathering of information targeted citizens 
and domestic groups for reasons bearing no relation to national security. 
Instead, the premise of the programs was to use the FBI as a law 
enforcement agency to eliminate perceived threats to the current political 
and social order of the country.56 According to the FBI, groups promoting 
ideologies such as women’s liberation, civil rights, or opposing political 
views threatened domestic tranquility.57 One of the first COINTELPRO 
initiatives, conducted against the Communist Party, USA (“CPUSA”),58 
did appear to have national security as its intended motivation: “We were 
trying first to develop intelligence so we would know what they were 
doing, and second, to contain the threat. . . . To stop the spread of 
communism, to stop the effectiveness of the Communist Party as a vehicle 
of Soviet intelligence, propaganda and agitation.”59 However, the FBI’s 
CPUSA program quickly expanded to non-Communists and persons with 
 
 49. See id. at 5.  




 51. See id. 
 52. Id. at 3. 
 53. Church II, supra note 6, at 6.  
 54. See id. 
 55. Memorandum from A.H. Belmont to L.V. Boardman (Dec. 8, 1954). 
 56. See Church III, supra note 50, at 3.  
 57. See id. at 4.  
 58. CPUSA still exists today and bills itself as “a political party of the working class, for the 
working class, with no corporate sponsors or billionaire backers.” See COMMUNIST PARTY USA, 
www.cpusa.org (last visited on March 26, 2020).  
 59. Church III, supra note 50, at 5. 
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little to no affiliation with the group.60 Subsequent programs dropped the 
pretense of being counterintelligence conducted for the sake of national 
security purposes and became covert actions directed against American 
citizens.61 
Adapting programs from a playbook initially used by the FBI against 
foreign agents resulted in the domestic use of wartime surveillance 
gathering techniques. The use of “rough, tough, and dirty” tactics led to 
American citizens under FBI surveillance being treated no differently 
than enemy combatants.62 Many of the techniques internally approved by 
the FBI for use were illegal and dangerous, carrying a real risk of causing 
physical, emotional, or economic distress for the target.63 The Church 
Committee report provides many examples: 
[The FBI] techniques ranged from anonymously mailing reprints of 
newspaper and magazine articles to group members or supporters to 
convince them of the error of their ways, to mailing anonymous letters to 
a member’s spouse accusing the target of infidelity; from using informants 
to raise controversial issues at meetings in order to cause dissent, to the 
“snitch jacket” (falsely labeling a group member as an informant), and 
encouraging street warfare between violent groups; from contacting 
members of a legitimate group to expose the alleged subversive 
background of a fellow member, to contacting an employer to get a target 
fired; from attempting to arrange for reporters to interview targets with 
planted questions, to trying to stop targets from speaking at all; from 
notifying state and local authorities of a target’s criminal law violations, to 
using the IRS to audit a professor, not just to collect any taxes owing, but 
to distract him from his political activities.64     
Over time, COINTELPRO’s covert action programs became aimed 
primarily at five different groups posing a “threat” to national security.65 
In addition to the CPUSA, the FBI opened investigative programs into the 
Socialist Worker’s Party, the White Hate Group, the Black Nationalist-
Hate Group, and the New Left.66 All of these labels were distinctions with 
no clear definition and ultimately allowed the FBI to target persons it 
deemed “rabble rousers,” “agitators,” “key activists,” or “key black 
 
 60. Church III, supra note 50, at 6.  
 61. See id.  
 62. See generally, Church II, supra note 6, at 11. In response to questioning about these tactics, 
Sullivan testified that “This is a rough, tough, dirty business, and dangerous . . . No holds were barred . . 
. We have used these techniques against Soviet agents. They have used them against us. The same methods 
were brought home against any organization which we targeted. We did not differentiate.”  
 63. See Church III, supra note 50, at 8-9. 
 64. Id. at 8.  
 65. See id. at 4. 
 66. Id. 
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extremists.”67 
The FBI carried out these COINTELPRO programs knowing they 
violated state and federal provisions against mail fraud, wire fraud, 
incitement to violence, sending obscene material through the mail, and 
extortion.68 The use of electronic surveillance violated the Fourth 
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.69 
When told a program was illegal, the FBI justified its continued use on 
the ground that “national security” permitted programs that would 
otherwise be illegal.70 Supervisors abdicated responsibility by not asking 
for details of particular programs that were known to use legally 
questionable techniques.71 The overriding theme amongst the FBI was not 
to ask whether the program was legal, but whether it would work.72  
In terms of improper electronic surveillance tactics, the most infamous 
example is the FBI’s wiretapping of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Four 
months after Dr. King led the March on Washington, FBI leaders 
convened to discuss “avenues of approach aimed at neutralizing King as 
an effective Negro leader.”73 Agents were ordered to gather information 
to be used against King in an effort to discredit him.74 Over the next two 
years, FBI agents placed at least fourteen microphones in Dr. King’s hotel 
rooms across the country.75 Photographic surveillance accompanied some 
of the microphone coverage.76 The FBI monitored King’s tax returns, 
created and mailed threatening tapes to his home, and attempted to 
undermine King’s relationships with other leaders and institutions around 
the world.77 After Dr. King’s death in 1968, agents proposed continuing 
these illegal tactics in order to harass his widow and prevent his birthday 
from becoming a national holiday.78 This historical background of abuse 
played a large part in congressional effort to reform intelligence gathering 
activity.  
 
 67. Church II, supra note 6, at 88. 
 68. Id. at 139. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 138. 
 71. See id. 
 72. Church II, supra note 6, at 141 (Sullivan testimony stating “The one thing we were concerned 
about was this: Will this course of action work, will it get us what we want, will we reach the objective 
that we desire to reach? As far as legality is concerned, it was never raised by myself or anybody else.”) 
 73. Church II, supra note 6, at 220. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. at 223. 
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C. Reform Attempts and the Warrant Application Process 
1. Title III Warrants 
Prior to the enactment of FISA, electronic surveillance undertaken for 
national security or foreign intelligence purposes was subject to little or 
no judicial or legislative oversight.79 In the lead up to World War II, 
President Franklin Roosevelt approved warrantless wiretapping “to 
secure information by listening devices directed to the conversation or 
other communications of persons suspected of subversive activities 
against the [g]overnment of the United States, including suspected 
spies.”80 President Roosevelt accepted the Supreme Court’s previous 
rulings which barred the use of evidence obtained from wiretaps in 
criminal prosecutions,81 but concluded that the Supreme Court never 
intended that dicta to apply “to grave matters involving the defense of the 
nation.”82 Roosevelt’s claim represented the first time the Executive 
Branch asserted the right to conduct electronic surveillance for national 
security purposes.83 His memorandum authorizing warrantless electronic 
surveillance was not questioned until 1965. During that time span, the 
government conducted nearly 7,000 wiretaps and 2,200 microphone 
surveillances.84 In addition to the wiretapping discussed above against 
King and other political leaders, the government placed taps on the phone 
lines of reporters and journalists to investigate leaks of government 
information.85    
Revelation of the many abuses within the Intelligence Community 
motivated Congress to regulate wiretaps in Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Title III”).86 Title III set forth 
circumstances and procedures to be followed in the use of electronic 
surveillance.87 Chief among them was statute’s requirement that 
 
 79. KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 3:1. 
 80. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 616 (D.C. Cir.1975). 
 81. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that warrantless electronic 
surveillance conducted through non-trespassory methods is an unreasonable search and seizure that 
violates the Fourth Amendment). However, the Court cautioned in a footnote that a Fourth Amendment 
question involving the national security was not presented in this case. This footnote is the first indication 
the Court may indeed believe there is a national security exception to the Fourth Amendment.  
 82. Zweibon 516 F.2d at 617. 
 83. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 3:1. 
 84. FISA House Intelligence Report at 16. 
 85. See Church II, supra note 6, at 63-65. A small sampling of the people Attorney General Robert 
Kennedy approved wiretaps for includes: Nation of Islam officials, leaders of the Ku Klux Klan, Malcom 
X, Newsweek reporter Lloyd Norman, and New York Times reporter Hanson Baldwin. 
 86. See S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153 – 56 (detailing 
reasons for enacting Title III). 
 87. Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 802 (enacted June 19, 1968).  
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government agencies obtain judicial authorization before conducting any 
form of electronic surveillance.88 However, Congress implicitly assumed 
the President had inherent authority to conduct electronic surveillance for 
national security or foreign intelligence purposes and made clear that Title 
III did not “disturb” the President’s powers in that arena.89 The DOJ 
concluded that warrantless electronic surveillance was acceptable within 
the parameters of national security and foreign intelligence 
investigations.90 This left the President with tremendous discretion to 
target domestic citizens and groups without supervision or oversight from 
the other branches of government.91  
Four years later, the Supreme Court began attempting to limit 
Presidential authority when conducting warrantless electronic 
surveillance for national security purposes.92 The Court stated that 
Section 2511(3) of Title III was merely a recognition of certain rights 
granted to the Executive Branch constitutionally, not a conferral of power 
for the President to conduct electronic surveillance “solely within the 
discretion of the Executive Branch.”93 The Court held that in domestic 
security cases, the Fourth Amendment required judicial approval before 
the government conducted electronic surveillance.94 That being said, the 
Court acquiesced that because “domestic security surveillance may 
involve different policy and practical considerations from the surveillance 
of ‘ordinary crime,’” the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard 
differed from the Title III probable cause showing required to obtain a 
criminal warrant.95 For practical purposes, the Court ruled that the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement applied to the domestic aspects of 
electronic surveillance and any authority the President had to conduct 
warrantless surveillance could only be used to protect against foreign 
threats or for foreign intelligence purposes.96 Congress used this holding 
 
 88. 18 U.S.C. § 2518. 
 89. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3); See also, Legislative History, S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), as reprinted 
in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2156 – 57. 
 90. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, §3:5. Title III identified five categories of presidential 
action that fell outside its regulation: (1) protection of the United States against actual or potential attack 
or other hostile acts of a foreign power, (2) obtaining foreign intelligence information deemed essential 
to the security of the United States, (3) protecting national security information against foreign intelligence 
activities, (4) protecting the Unite4d States against the overthrow of the government by force or other 
unlawful means; and (5) protecting the United States against any other clear and present danger to the 
structure or existence of the government. 
 91. See id. 
 92. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (popularly called 
the “Keith” case after the district judge who was the respondent). 
 93. See id. at 316-17. 
 94. See id.  
 95. See id. at 323. 
 96. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 3:6. 
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as the backdrop against which it began drafting FISA in the late 1970’s.97  
2. FISA Warrants 
 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) of 1978 regulated 
national security investigations conducted by electronic surveillance, and 
later by physical searches, for the first time. The misuse of electronic 
surveillance by the FBI revealed in the Church Committee report guided 
legislators in drafting FISA.98 Recommendation fifty-two by the 
committee was that “all non-consensual electronic surveillance should be 
conducted pursuant to judicial warrants issued under authority of Title III 
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.”99 The same 
committee recommendation urged Congress to amend the Act to allow 
surveillance of foreigners in the United States when there is probable 
cause that “the target is an officer, employee, or conscious agent of a 
foreign power” and the Attorney General has certified that the 
surveillance is likely to reveal information necessary for national 
security.100 After years of debate, Congress enacted FISA to authorize and 
regulate certain governmental electronic surveillance of communications 
for foreign intelligence purposes.  
Originally, FISA regulated only electronic surveillance and not 
physical searches. Congress felt that while it may be necessary to develop 
legislative controls in this area, physical searches were sufficiently 
different from electronic surveillance to require separate consideration by 
Congress.101 Over the next fifteen years, warrantless physical searches for 
the purposes of foreign intelligence required only that the Attorney 
General determine the target was likely an agent of a foreign power and 
approve of the type of activity involved.102 In this same time period, the 
judicial branch struggled to determine whether there was a foreign 
intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause.103 
Most courts agreed that “the Executive Branch need not always obtain a 
warrant for foreign intelligence surveillance,” but that the “executive 
should be excused from securing a warrant only when the surveillance is 
conducted ‘primarily’ for foreign intelligence purposes.”104 This 
 
 97. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (recognizing that “when enacting FISA, 
Congress legislated against the backdrop of our decision in” the Keith case). 
 98. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 3:7. 
 99. Church II, supra note 6, at 327.  
 100. See id.  
 101. FISA House Intelligence Report at 53. 
 102. Exec. Order No. 12036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674 (1978). This order reflects the requirements that 
Congress would soon place on electronic surveillance in FISA. 
 103. KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 3.7. 
 104. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913-15 (4th Cir. 1980). 
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“primary purpose” test concluded that a FISA warrant would violate the 
Fourth Amendment if the information being gathered was used primarily 
for a criminal investigation.105 This interpretation, distinguishing foreign 
intelligence gathering for the purpose of national security from gathering 
evidence for criminal prosecution, became known as the “FISA wall.”106 
Congressional amendments to FISA after the September 11, 2001 attacks 
on the United States eliminated the primary purpose test and the FISA 
wall.107  
The issue of warrantless physical searches came to the forefront in 
1993 when the DOJ charged CIA employee Aldrich Ames with 
espionage. The counterintelligence investigation conducted by the FBI 
and CIA included a warrantless search of Ames’ home.108 There was 
doubt within the DOJ about whether a court would find that the primary 
purpose of the search was to further a criminal prosecution.109 This would 
violate the FISA wall and result in the evidence gathered being 
suppressed, despite then Attorney General Janet Reno’s approval of the 
warrantless search. Ames pled guilty before the government was put in 
the awkward position of having Reno testify as to her reasons for granting 
the search.110 Shortly thereafter, in 1994, Congress amended FISA to 
regulate foreign intelligence physical searches on the same terms 
applicable to electronic surveillance searches.111  
D. United States v. Gartenlaub 
On October 23, 2014, a grand jury in the Central District of California 
indicted Keith Gartenlaub, an employee of Boeing, for receipt and 
possession of child pornography.112 The investigation began in 2012 
when Wesley Harris, an FBI agent in Los Angeles, read an article in 
Wired magazine asserting that China may have acquired the blueprints for 
certain Boeing aircraft military transport planes.113 No evidence pointed 
to Gartenlaub; rather, Agent Harris focused on Gartenlaub because his 
position at Boeing gave him access to the supposedly stolen data and his 
wife was born in China.114 Harris obtained a standard judicial warrant 
under Title III for electronic surveillance and obtained Gartenlaub’s and 
 
 105. KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 3:7. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See infra Part III(A).  
 108. KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 3:7. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Brief for Appellant, supra note 16.  
 113. See id. at 5. 
 114. Id.  
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his wife’s personal email accounts.115 Not finding information to 
corroborate his theory, Agent Harris then turned to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) and received a FISA warrant to 
search Gartenlaub’s home and computers.116 Agents conducted the secret 
search on January 29 and 30, 2014, and imaged three hard drives found 
in the house.117 Again, the FBI found no evidence that Gartenlaub acted 
as a spy for China.118 The agents did find a handful of files containing 
child pornography.119  
Relying on the child pornography found during the FISA warrant 
search—and describing the search in the probable cause affidavit only as 
“a court-authorized search without notice”—FBI agents went back to the 
magistrate judge for a Title III warrant to search Gartenlaub’s premises.120 
At trial, Gartenlaub challenged the FISA search of his home and requested 
disclosure of the underlying FISA application and order.121 He also 
requested a Franks hearing to establish that the underlying FISA warrant, 
and therefore the later Title III warrant obtained using information found 
during the FISA search, contained “intentional or reckless material 
falsehoods or omissions.”122 In response, the FBI submitted a classified 
motion in opposition which the district court reviewed in camera and ex 
parte.123 The court denied Gartenlaub’s motion to suppress the evidence 
from either warrant, though it later expressed misgivings regarding the 
propriety of the FISA court proceedings.124 The government provided the 
defense team with a heavily redacted version of their motion in 
opposition, effectively leaving Gartenlaub to mount a defense against 
unknown and secret information. 
No evidence emerged at trial showing that Gartenlaub was aware of the 
files containing child pornography. The images had been copied onto his 
hard drive as part of a mass migration of files, not downloaded in a cache 
file or unallocated space.125 Nine years passed between the copying of the 
 
 115. Id. at 6. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at 7. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id.  
 120. Id.  
 121. See id. at 3-4. 
 122. Id. at 4. Defendants generally cannot challenge the accuracy of information contained in a 
search warrant. However, a defendant may request a Franks hearing in order to prove the probable cause 
affidavit underlying the warrant deliberately provided false evidence or there was reckless disregard for 
whether the information in the affidavit was truthful. If the defendant proves the affidavit’s content was 
insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search 
excluded. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).   
 123. Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, at 4. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 15. 
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files containing child pornography and the FBI seizing the hard drives. 
During that time, the files were not opened or viewed.126 Multiple other 
people had access to Gartenlaub’s computer during the relevant time 
period.127 Lack of evidence notwithstanding, the jury convicted 
Gartenlaub on both counts of receiving and possessing child 
pornography.128 The district court dismissed the receipt count as 
multiplicitous and sentenced Gartenlaub to forty-one months 
imprisonment.129              
III. DISCUSSION 
The Gartenlaub decision, while problematic, followed the historical 
tradition of courts denying defendants the opportunity to view FISA 
information being used against them during prosecution.130 In fact, until 
February of 2018, no defendant had ever been able to view a FISA 
warrant application used against them. The reason always given was that 
it would compromise the national security of the United States. In 
Gartenlaub for example, then Attorney General Eric Holder declared that: 
[T]he unauthorized disclosure of the FISA Materials that are classified at 
the “TOP SECRET” level could reasonably be expected to cause 
exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States. I 
further certify that the unauthorized disclosure of the FISA materials that 
are classified at the “SECRET” level could be expected to cause serious 
damage to the national security of the United States. The FISA Materials 
contain sensitive and classified information concerning United States 
intelligence sources and methods and other information related to efforts 
of the United States to conduct national security investigations, including 
the manner and means by which those investigations are conducted. As a 
result, the unauthorized disclosure of the information could harm the 
national security interests of the United States.131 
It is hard to fathom how the detailing of an investigation into child 
pornography would reveal state secrets critical to maintaining national 
security. But the government knows this catch-all reasoning will face little 
scrutiny. The mere invocation of “national security” is enough to ensure 
intrusion into civil liberties with no oversight. American citizens, 
especially in the wake of the September 11th attacks and the subsequent 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 17. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
 130. See infra Section III(B) for discussion of the Carter Page FISA applications. 
 131. Government’s Notice of Filing Attorney General’s Declaration and Claim of Privilege at ¶ 5, 
United States v. Gartenlaub, No. SA CR 14-173-CAS (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2015). 
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demise of the FISA wall, have freely given up any pretense of demanding 
privacy rights whenever the government demands those rights yield to 
national security. Unfortunately, the judiciary has followed suit. Using 
FISA in this manner contradicts the original congressional intent behind 
the legislation. Further, the recent public disclosure of the Carter Page 
application proves that underlying information contained in FISA 
applications can, and should, be disclosed to defendants in criminal 
prosecutions.   
A. The Demise of the FISA Wall 
As originally enacted, FISA created a wall between intelligence 
agencies and law enforcement agencies. Maintaining this wall meant that 
use of a FISA warrant for the primary purpose of collecting information 
for criminal prosecution constituted a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.132 When applying for a FISA warrant, agents must first 
identify the target and establish that the target is a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power.133 Next, a high-ranking executive is required to 
certify that the purpose of the warrant was to obtain foreign intelligence 
information. Only then could a judge of the FISC decide if there was 
probable cause to allow surveillance of the target. 
This process changed in response to the September 11th attacks. Shortly 
thereafter, the DOJ asked Congress for an amendment to FISA to allow 
greater coordination between intelligence agencies and law enforcement. 
This amendment, Section 504 of the Patriot Act, allows federal officers 
to “consult with Federal law enforcement officers to coordinate efforts” 
when acquiring foreign intelligence information during national security 
investigations.134 The Patriot Act also reduced the “primary purpose” test 
to a “significant purpose” test.135 Thus, the Patriot Act allowed FISA to 
be used primarily to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution, but only 
if the prosecution concerns an offense related to a foreign intelligence 
threat. The FISC divided crime into two categories— foreign intelligence 
crimes and ordinary crimes—and held that FISA could be used to 
primarily to obtain evidence of a foreign intelligence crime, but not of an 
ordinary crime. In other words, the FISA wall between intelligence and 
law enforcement no longer exists, contrary to the original intent of 
Congress. 
Even without the FISA wall, the FBI should not have been allowed to 
target Gartenlaub using a FISA warrant. The FBI first obtained a criminal 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.  
 134. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(k) and 1825(k). 
 135. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B). 
17
Brumfield: On American Demagoguery to National Security
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
526 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
search warrant for access to Gartenlaub and his wife’s email accounts in 
its search for a supposed Chinese spy at Boeing. Failing to find such 
evidence, the government then executed a physical FISA search warrant 
to search Gartenlaub’s house and image his computers. The FBI had 
permission to search for physical evidence relating to the specific 
investigation of whether Gartenlaub was giving information from 
Boeing’s computer network to China, not to electronically surveil and 
copy every file on every hard drive owned by Gartenlaub to see what they 
could come up with. The government is only supposed to target foreign 
actors like Gartenlaub’s “well connected” Chinese parents-in-law, not 
Gartenlaub himself. Yet by all appearances, the investigation started and 
ended with Gartenlaub himself. 
Additionally, child pornography is not a foreign intelligence crime. 
Foreign intelligence crimes are defined by statute as attacks or potential 
attacks against the United States, sabotage, international terrorism, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and clandestine activities 
by an agent of a foreign power.136 As applied to Gartenlaub, the statute 
requires the FBI to search for information relating to the protection of the 
United States against Chinese spying. Even the most generous reading of 
the statute cannot plausibly be said to include child pornography. 
Christopher Wray, current Director of the FBI, confirmed in a 2017 
speech that child pornography is not foreign intelligence information.137 
Authorization of the FISA warrant against Gartenlaub to primarily gain 
evidence of an ordinary domestic crime violated congressional intent, the 
FISC’s judicial interpretation of FISA, and the FBI Director’s public 
assurances that child pornography could not be investigated as foreign 
intelligence information. 
B. The Carter Page Application 
The decades old tradition of denying defendants access to their 
underlying FISA warrant applications was finally broken in 2018 by an 
unlikely hero: Devin Nunes, U.S. House Representative for California’s 
22nd congressional district.138 In 2018, Nunes was also the chairman of 
 
 136. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c). 
 137. FBI Director Christopher Wray on FISA Section 702 Renewal, (CSPAN television broadcast 
Oct. 13, 2017), at 31:09, https://www.c-span.org/video/?435695-2/fbi-director-christopher-wray-fisa-
section-702-renewal. 
“The only stuff that’s in [the FISA application] is information about foreigners reasonably believed to be 
overseas for foreign intelligence purposes. So that’s foreign intelligence information that’s in there. It’s 
not evidence of, I don’t know, take an example, you know, child porn or, you know, something else. Could 
be very serious, but that’s not what’s in there.” 
 138. Nunes’ memo represented a stark retreat from his usual strong support for FISA. Ironically, 
Nunes sponsored and voted in favor of a bill reauthorizing FISA during the exact time period the Nunes 
18
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss2/8
2021] ON AMERICAN DEMAGOGUERY TO NATIONAL SECURITY 527 
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (“HPSCI”) and 
produced a memorandum suggesting the FBI improperly acquired a 
wiretap on Carter Page.139 Nunes claimed that the FBI misled the FISA 
court by failing to disclose its reliance on research conducted by an 
opposing political party in the FISA application. The memo “raise[d] 
concerns as to the legitimacy and legality” of Page’s FISA application, 
alleged that the FISA warrant “may have relied on politically motivated 
or questionable sources,” and stated the warrant failed to establish 
probable cause.140 Conservative members of Congress argued that Nunes’ 
memo showed evidence of political bias in the FISA warrant process.  
Not surprisingly, the DOJ opposed public release of the Nunes memo 
because it contained information from the Page FISA application. The 
FBI warned the memo was inaccurate and fell back on its usual defense 
that release of the information would jeopardize classified information 
vital to national security, in addition to setting a dangerous precedent.141 
President Trump disagreed and declassified the memo for public release, 
stating that “the public interest in disclosure outweighs any need to protect 
the information.”142 Then Speaker of the House Paul Ryan agreed that 
release of the HPSCI memo “provide[d] greater transparency” about the 
FISA process and “ensure[d] the FISA system works as intended and 
Americans’ rights are properly safeguarded.”143 Despite its opposition, 
the DOJ eventually also released redacted versions of the four FISA 
warrant applications for Carter Page on July 21, 2018.144   
The release of the Carter Page FISA application for politically 
motivated purposes should end any judicial deference given to DOJ 
claims that releasing these warrants to criminal defendants somehow 
 
memo circulated claiming abuse in the FISA process. E.g., FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 
2017, H.R. 4478, 115th Cong. (2018) (sponsored by Devin Nunes); See also Erin Kelly, House votes to 
renew surveillance law that may collect Americans’ emails without warrant, USA TODAY (Jan. 11, 2018, 
11:57 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/01/11/house-vote-privacy-advocates-
offer-changes-controversial-surveillance/1020930001/. 
 139. Carter Page is the founder and managing partner of Global Energy Capital, a fund investing in 
the Russian energy sector. Page also served in some capacity for the Donald Trump campaign. See 
Management, GLOBAL ENERGY CAPITAL, LLC, http://globalenergycap.com/management/ (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2020). 
 140. See Lena Felton, The Full Text of the Nunes Memo, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 2, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/read-the-full-text-of-the-nunes-memo/552191/.  
 141. Reuters, Justice Department warned White House about releasing memo (Jan. 30, 2018, 10:06 
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-memo/justice-department-warned-white-
house-about-releasing-memo-washington-post-idUSKBN1FK0AJ. 
 142. Letter from John D. Cline to Molly C. Dwyer, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, Rule 28(j) Letter Concerning HPSCI Memoranda, United States v. Keith Gartenlaub, No. 
16-50339 (Feb. 24, 2018). 
 143. Id.  
 144. See Carter Page FISA application, available at 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4614708/Carter-Page-FISA-Application.pdf. 
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presents a grave danger to national security. Gartenlaub, unlike Page, 
presented real evidence of reason to suspect improprieties in the warrant 
process. The original Title III warrant failed to establish any link between 
Gartenlaub and Chinese spies.145 Undeterred, Agent Harris turned to the 
FISC with nothing more than his theory that a Boeing engineer with 
Chinese in-laws must be a spy.146 When the FISA warrant also failed to 
produce the corroborating evidence that Harris was sure existed, he 
claimed Gartenlaub was in possession of child pornography. The FBI 
based this accusation on files that were copied along with tens of 
thousands of other files, not downloaded, onto Gartenlaub’s hard drive.147 
Multiple other people had access to the computers and there was no 
evidence the files were ever opened or viewed.148 Gartenlaub proved the 
investigative process was suspect in his case, but was still denied the 
opportunity to view the FISA application and challenge the seemingly 
non-existent probable cause leading to his conviction.  
At the time of the Nunes memo’s release, Gartenlaub was awaiting a 
decision from the Ninth Circuit challenging his own ability to access the 
FISA warrant application obtained against him. Gartenlaub’s attorney 
sent a letter to the Court pointing out the logical conclusion for his client 
based on the DOJ’s handling of the Carter Page situation: 
The declassification of the HPSCI memoranda demonstrates that it is 
possible to discuss publicly the merits of a FISA application without 
damaging national security. In addition, the declassification of the 
memoranda highlights the absurdity of the government's assertion, in this 
and other cases involving motions to suppress FISA surveillance, that any 
disclosure of a FISA application, even to cleared defense counsel under the 
protections of CIPA, would harm national security. If the HPSCI 
memoranda can be disclosed without harming national security, as the 
Executive Branch has determined, at least comparable disclosure of the 
Gartenlaub FISA application can be made to cleared defense counsel under 
CIPA without causing such harm.149 
Surely, if all four Carter Page FISA applications can be released for 
public consumption, then defense counsel across the country can be 
trusted to view similar information without compromising national 
security. The Ninth Circuit erred when deciding otherwise. Both the 
executive and legislative branches decided that the public interest in 
 
 145. Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, at 7.  
 146. See id. at 9. 
 147. See id. at 10. 
 148. See id. 
 149. Letter from John D. Cline to Molly C. Dwyer, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, Rule 28(j) Letter Concerning HPSCI Memoranda, United States v. Keith Gartenlaub, No. 
16-50339 (Feb. 24, 2018). 
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Carter Page outweighed any need to protect the underlying FISA 
information. It is past time for the “public interest” to include a criminal 
defendant’s absolute right to the best possible defense. Zealous advocacy 
is not possible in our adversarial system unless both sides have all the 
facts.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit squandered the best opportunity yet to push back 
against the intrusive use of FISA-gathered intelligence in domestic 
criminal prosecutions. The demise of the FISA wall in the Patriot Act 
allows law enforcement to obtain evidence of ordinary crimes through the 
use of FISA warrants, which were never intended to be used against 
American citizens in this manner. Additionally, the release of the Carter 
Page FISA application negates any good-faith argument by the 
government that protecting the underlying information is critical to 
national security. Carter Page should not be provided a level of due 
process denied to other criminal defendants simply for being on the right 
side of the current political administration. Congress should reinstate the 
FISA wall during the next FISA reauthorization. At the same time, the 
judiciary must stop giving the Intelligence Community the benefit of the 
doubt. The line between foreign intelligence information and ordinary 
crimes evaporated with Gartenlaub’s conviction. There is no mechanism 
left to stop the FBI from switching back and forth between Title III 
warrants and FISA warrants to prosecute American citizens domestically. 
Unless the judicial branch steps up in its capacity as the stalwart of justice, 
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